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Money Didn’t Buy Happiness*
Lawrence J. Fox**
I. PROBLEMS
“It’s a great profession.  You’ll never be bored.  Of course you
won’t make a lot of money.  But you’ll always be comfortable.”
Those are the words of admonition an aspiring law student
would have heard about the prospects of becoming a lawyer until
the 70s.  Prestige?  Yes.  Intellectual challenge?  For sure.  A sense
of purpose?  Undoubtedly.  And, like the school teacher, an ac-
knowledgment that the calling was its own reward.  The thankful-
ness of a client, the recognition in the community, the satisfaction
of crafting an innovative solution or precedent defying argument
each cherished as satisfaction enough.
The vision is idealized, masking both a few extremely well-paid
professionals and thousands of unhappy practitioners who found lit-
tle or no professional or financial satisfaction from what their seven
year education brought them.  But it contains more than a nugget
of truth, and a power over today’s profession that makes its accu-
racy largely irrelevant.
For today, the profession, at certain levels, enjoys a prosperity
that was unthinkable thirty years ago.  Nowhere in the Talmud is it
written that the average partner in the top twenty law firms in
America (a total of almost 2400 partners) would be making
$750,000 per year, even in the allegedly parlous 90s.  Indeed, for our
aspiring lawyer from the 60s it would be inconceivable that one
could “look up” such figures for any law firm but your own.  Now a
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profession-observing (or perhaps profession-defining) legal press,
led by the American Lawyer, has not only managed to secure this
most private of information, but encouraged once circumspect law
firms to flaunt these profitability figures as they seek the only rec-
ognition that seems to count today: “Our firm has the highest prof-
its per partner of any firm in [name your city].”  Similarly, there is
no edict requiring that general counsel of Fortune 200 companies
would earn more than $1,000,000 in salary, without counting their
lucrative and ethically dubious stock options and other corporate
perks.  Nor is it mandated that some plaintiff’s contingent fee law-
yers would boast of eight figure annual incomes.
Yet all of that has occurred, leaving our 60s observer in disbe-
lief and, one would have hoped, able to give a 90s speech to those
contemplating a legal career about it being “a great profession and
you’ll make a lot of money.”  But instead we learn that the entire
scene is marred by dissatisfaction. Americans hold the profession in
low esteem, and worse yet, for the first time clients are dissatisfied
with their own lawyers.  And lawyers are an unhappy lot, leaving
the profession in droves, or languishing in jobs they no longer en-
joy, refusing to recommend law as a worthwhile calling for their
children.  We find that an entire political revolution, the Republi-
cans’ capture of the Congress in 1994, was built on a plank of at-
tacking values near and dear to lawyers’ most important principles.
And ABC News, in an uncharacteristic lapse from any semblance
of objectivity, provides a forum for one of its reporters to call law-
yers extortionists, engaged in a racket, part of a legal system that is
“a laughingstock of the world.”
II. CAUSES AND EFFECTS
What has caused all of this? The search for causes (mixed in
with some effects) is not difficult.  Some might assert the root of all
evil is the billable hour, though actually what they are referring to is
far more complex.  There was a time when lawyers simply charged a
fee for a service.  Then some in-house counsel, concerned about the
arbitrariness and unpredictability of that approach, insisted that
lawyers should bill based on the time devoted to an engagement,
lending a precision to the billing process that admittedly was more
apparent than real.
Next, the computer came along, to permit the accumulation of
a great deal of hourly data. This was followed by the great eco-
nomic discovery that after X hours of work a lawyer’s salary and
overhead were covered for the year and any additional hours billed
and collected traveled directly, “without passing go,” to the bottom
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line.  This led to wondrous calculations that if every lawyer in the
firm could only add 50, or 100, or 200 hours per year, the gross (and
net) effect on profits would be dramatic and extremely satisfying.
Then came demands that these increases be achieved, with reports
of billable hour accomplishments belched out monthly, ranking
lawyers by production with notations to tell who was ahead of tar-
get and who behind.
The rise in stature, power, and control of in-house counsel has
been a major contributor to lawyer ennui.  When old First of Phila-
delphia hired Caldwell & Moore for all its legal matters (but un-
seemly collections) and Caldwell & Moore’s senior lawyer, Lewis
Harlow, sat on this client’s Board of Directors, the cozy relationship
generated no anxiety, and the one line fee bills that read “For pro-
fessional services for the month of June, 19__” were paid without
question by return mail.  Now with a Vice President and General
Counsel who has replaced Harlow on the Board and an in-house
staff of fifteen, half the legal work has been brought inside.  First of
Philadelphia, now known as The First, regularly distributes its work
among twelve firms (“We hire lawyers not law firms”), and all work
is performed following elaborate protocols down to the need to get
permission to use Fedex or have more than one lawyer attend a
deposition.  These professional services are billed in accordance
with detailed formats that account for time in six minute intervals,
generating a level of detail that replaces meaningful information
with a blizzard of statistical data.  The client may save money and
even, perhaps, get higher quality services, but the benefits have not
been delivered on a cost-free basis.  Among the casualties are client
loyalty (of course we can take a position adverse to The First), the
easy familiarity that comes from a long-term relationship, a cadre of
in-house lawyers who are trapped between fawning, business-seek-
ing outside counsel and crushing management demands to reduce
the cost of the legal function, and expenses that are viewed as a
decided nuisance or, worse, as contributing not one wit to the bot-
tom line.
To in-house counsel goes the credit for inventing the beauty
contest, an unseemly competition among law firms responding to
requests for proposals (R.F.P.)—as if law work is like a commodity
not unlike building highways—in which the first casualties are can-
dor and analysis.  Successive teams of lawyers parade before sage
in-house counsel who make judgments based on thirty-minute
presentations more dedicated to flattery and hyperbole than the
merits of the matter.  This process gets raised to a high art form on
Steve Brill’s Counsel Connect which launches the R.F.P. process
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into cyberspace, fueling the anxiety of outside counsel with head-
lines that warn:  “This could be your client. And if you’re not there
to respond, this could be your former client.”
The epitome of the adversarial relationship that has developed
between outside and in-house counsel is the legal audit, the
dreaded outside review of time records and other charges in which,
with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, many litigation decisions are
second guessed as costing the client too much (“Why did you have
three lawyers at that strategy conference?”—a clear example of
churning) or as failing to meet a cost-benefit analysis (“How could
it take ten hours to write a four page memo?”).  What is the level of
self-esteem and trust that results from the spectre of the pointy-
pencil crew swooping in to review the law firm’s records?
But before a misimpression is left, it must be recognized that
the bulk of the problems facing lawyers in firms has been generated
internally.  One problem, largely beyond the control of the lawyers,
has been the growth of technology which has had at least two differ-
ent but equally debilitating effects.  First, the cost of running a law
firm has skyrocketed as typewriters gave way to mainframe com-
puters which, in turn, gave way to personal computers intercon-
nected through elaborate networks, as the telephone became an
elaborate telecommunications device, and as a firm’s investment in
printers, fax machines, scanners, and telephone switches has soared
into the stratosphere.  Second, lawyers have become totally depen-
dent on Information Service Directors and their staffs in a way the
lawyers of old were dependent on no one.  This loss of control has
been accompanied by a dislocation in the financial pecking order.
Once even the most junior lawyer made more money than the
firm’s highest paid law firm staff person.  Today, many staff mem-
bers, from non-lawyer Executive Directors on down, earn more
than many partners, deservedly so, but the effect is destabilizing
nonetheless.
Another problem, for which lawyers are more perpetrators
than victims, is the breakdown of firm stability reflected in the
growth of lateral hiring, a trend that started as a trickle but today is
nothing short of a torrent.  At one time lawyers joined firms for life,
starting as associates just out of law school or a clerkship, with a
high level of expectation they would become partners.  The thought
of hiring an experienced lawyer from another firm just didn’t occur.
But as prospects for partnership began to lengthen, mentoring
evaporated, and the loyalty that kept lawyers on board shriveled,
entry level lawyers started thinking about their next job almost im-
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mediately, and firms were forced to search for fifth year associates
to fill gaps created by unwanted departures.
So long as this remained an associate phenomenon the damage
was containable.  But once the movement of lawyers reached into
the partner ranks, the effects were devastating.  Partners with large
“books of business” were sought by firms that ten years earlier
would never have thought of hiring anyone who was not a recent
law school graduate or law clerk. These itinerant partners, in turn,
were lured by the prospect that the profits per partner at the new
firm were higher than those at the departing firm, giving momen-
tum to a “cherry-picking” process that was sanitized by the use of
new service providers, the legal head hunters, whose calls flattered
and whose failure to call left partners with no inquiries feeling de-
cidedly left out. More important, the firm culture, once jealously
guarded and enthusiastically extolled, fell victim to the new part-
nership that included so many lawyers hired away from competitors
and therefore not inoculated with the Caldwell & Moore value
system.
A far worse result was the corollary of this:  the identification
of so-called unproductive partners, those outstanding lawyers who
had been rewarded with what once had been viewed as lifetime ten-
ure, only to find that their billable hours were not quite up to the
new standards and that they did not command the portable clients
that would make them attractive to other firms and therefore some-
one worth trying to retain at Caldwell & Moore. Could there be a
sadder sight than a fifty-five year old partner, having dedicated
thirty years of his professional life to Caldwell & Moore, forced out
by the firm for not being “fully engaged”?  Partners are victims of a
new mentality that asks not what contributions they have made to
the firm during their careers, but what they have done for the firm
this year, and which values a migratory lawyer with a sexy satchel of
business over a loyal partner who has dedicated a lifetime to the
enterprise.  And, like the devastating effect of capital punishment
on the executioner, the result of this new trend is not only exile for
the departing partners, but an overwhelming sense of remorse and
regret among the “lucky” ones who retain their positions, prompted
in part by the concern that the next round of down-sizing might
send them packing as well.
Lawyer advertising must be a factor in the loss of happiness as
well.  For decades, the legal profession did not advertise and old
ethics committee opinions consumed whole forests debating what
wording could go on law firm letterhead.  Then the Supreme Court
decided Bates, the constitutional walls came tumbling down, and
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the Yellow Pages became the home to full page display ads whose
bad taste, if not misleading nature, changed the image of the profes-
sion forever.  Admittedly, benefits flowed from the Madison Ave-
nue revolution:  the impenetrability of the profession vanished, and
information about affordability of legal services and rights that
could be vindicated was given wide currency.  But, yet again, the
upside was not cost free.  Lawyers hawking their services in thirty
second commercials that ran with similar length spiels for Vegemat-
ics, Carpet Shampooers, and Johnny Mathis CDs were inconsistent
with the image of a learned profession somehow above the com-
mercial din of the marketplace.
Most of the profession doesn’t advertise, you say, and there-
fore, this effect could not have been very far reaching.  To a certain
extent that’s true. Caldwell & Moore is not sponsoring Geraldo—
yet.  But the floodgates that opened after Bates have not left Cald-
well & Moore high and dry; they don’t call it advertising, of course,
but blatant commercialism still infects the firm’s operations.  Public
relations houses have been hired, press releases are issued daily re-
counting trivial accomplishments by firm lawyers (“Lucille Josephs,
a fourth year associate, gave a speech at a breakfast meeting spon-
sored by the firm”), firm newsletters and alerts, sent to huge mail-
ing lists including non-clients, give instant analysis on the latest
court decision or legislation, and institutional advertisements fea-
turing stately mansions and thoroughbred horses are found in every
charity program, all part of a zero-sum game in which no law firm
gains an advantage but the entire profession has a chance to emu-
late life insurance or penny stock salesmen.
The so-called ancillary business movement reflects another
way the profession has lost its soul.  Not content to deliver legal
services, firms looked with envy as their clients paid huge fees to
other service providers for non-legal services.  We could surely im-
prove the bottom line, the theory went, if, instead of sending our
clients to Merrill Lynch for investment advice, we had our own in-
vestment adviser in-house, or our own environmental testing ser-
vice, or our own merchant bank.  Thus began the development of
ancillary businesses for law firms, subsidiaries to which clients of
the firm could be referred and which, in turn, could refer clients
back to the firm.  The fact that such arrangements were ethically
dubious, confusing, and raised questions about conflicts, confidenti-
ality, and rule-violating feeder operations was ignored.  So was the
fact that the resemblance between a law firm with subsidiary opera-
tions and any other financial services firm called into serious ques-
tion the principle that Sears shouldn’t own a law firm.  Similarly
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ignored was the threat that establishing ancillary businesses had on
the entitlement of the legal profession to self-regulation.  If Cald-
well & Moore resembles a financial services department store (liti-
gation on 3; investment advice on 5) why shouldn’t the law firm be
regulated just like Citibank or PaineWebber?  Instead of emulating
our fellow professionals, the teachers, who as far as I know still
aren’t peddling school supplies or cafeteria services, our profession
followed our colleagues in the medical profession who have en-
gaged in a number of unfortunate practices in which their fees are
enhanced by selling diagnostic tests that are administered by doc-
tor-owned corporations.
III. A FEW IDEAS
If the catalogue of ills befalling the profession is easy to list, the
solutions remain as elusive as they seemed when first identified
more than a half decade ago.  As the trends have accelerated and
the dismay quotient rises, the rush to disillusionment continues un-
abated, prompting books like Anthony Kronman’s The Lost Law-
yer and Mary Ann Glendon’s A Nation Under Lawyers.
One thing is clear.  There is no one instant panacea that is go-
ing to turn things around.  The search for solutions is going to be
long and arduous, and it’s going to require not only leaders who are
prepared to run a marathon, but literally hundreds of thousands of
lawyers to say they are ready to stop griping and start doing some-
thing about it.  The following are just a couple of thoughts offered
tentatively and with no illusion that their implementation would re-
present a cure, but perhaps, just perhaps, they can stabilize the pa-
tient until those with more vision come up with more effective
solutions.
A. Leadership
First, we need leadership from within the profession.  It’s one
thing to have academics, the judiciary, and the media talking about
our ills.  It’s another to have private conversations among lawyers
at bar association cocktail parties decrying the present state of the
profession.  But until the leaders of the practicing bar throw off the
shackles of public silence, speak out on the evils they know exist,
and lead the search for solutions, the problems will continue not
only unabated but lead to worse effects than today’s scene presents.
When conferences addressing the crisis, featuring leaders of the
practicing bar, are as well attended as the American Lawyer’s
“Managing the Law Firm Bottom Line in the 90’s,” then things will
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begin to happen.  When the press features these newly emboldened
critics with the same gushing attention it now lavishes on the open-
ing of a new branch office or the merger with the shattered partners
of some capsizing law firm, then our priorities will have been set
aright.
One thought in this regard ironically enough comes from the
same Steve Brill whose chronicling of and contributions to our mal-
aise are well recognized.  Attacking a complacent organized bar,
Brill has suggested that a possible solution to the profession’s
problems would be to give our leadership longer terms in office.  If
it’s the President of the American Bar Association who should be
the spokesperson for the lawyers of the United States, why does
that person serve but one year, long enough to get exhausted from
criss-crossing the country, but hardly enough time to achieve a
name recognition of even one percent.  While the idea of rotating
leadership and spreading the glory around may have been totally
consistent with the profession’s needs in a less demanding era, we
either must take steps to create giants of the bar’s leaders or con-
vince the giants of the profession to accept these leadership posi-
tions, not just at the national level, but on the state and local levels
as well.  If this means making these jobs full-time, well-compen-
sated ones, that seems a very small price for the profession to pay to
have high visibility articulate spokespersons assuming the bully pul-
pits for three or more year terms.  Brill is certainly right that few
lawyers, let alone the public, can name the last five Presidents of
the ABA.  This is hardly the fault of the outstanding individuals
who have held that position.  Rather, it reflects the limitations that
are inherent in a one year term.
B. Billable Hours
Let me be clear at the start.  The solution to our problems is
not to take vows of poverty.  Indeed, in an era when script writers
for TV sitcoms can command $13,000,000 contracts and athletes
earn eight figures per year, there is nothing wrong with talented
lawyers earning very high incomes for their difficult labors.  But we
have to remind ourselves as we approach the fee issues which con-
front us, that unlike Steven Spielberg, Michael Jordan, and Deion
Sanders we are not free to charge whatever the market will bear.
Lawyers are fiduciaries; Arnold Schwarznagger is not. And lawyers’
fees, by ethical mandate, must be reasonable; Julia Roberts’s fees
are subject to no similar limitation.  Finally, lawyers have an obliga-
tion to explain the basis for their fees fully to their clients; no one
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would expect Barbra Streisand to provide MGM with any explana-
tion for her director’s fee.
Several specifics could ameliorate the concerns generated by
lawyers’ fees.  Most important is a whole series of issues raised by
the billable hour.  There is no doubt that this method of billing can
be an extremely fair way to charge for legal services.  Too often it is
impossible or at best extremely difficult for a lawyer to know how
much time will be required on an engagement.  In a transaction, the
negotiations can be short and sweet or long and protracted, the
shape of the transaction can change over time (“We’ll do a merger;
no, a sale of assets will be better”), tax issues can arise, lenders can
impose new conditions, and a myriad of other issues never contem-
plated in the beginning may arise.  On the litigation side, the im-
ponderables are equally disconcerting.  Will the case settle or be
tried, how many depositions need to be taken, will there be a mo-
tion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, how many years
will elapse before the case can be tried?
But the use of the billable hour depends entirely on the integ-
rity of the lawyers to (1) keep accurate time records, (2) proceed
efficiently, (3) make subtle judgments about the cost-benefit of un-
dertaking a particular task, and (4) avoid overstaffing.  So long as
lawyers remember their fiduciary obligation to put the interests of
the client ahead of the interests of the lawyer, there is no problem.
But too often we have read of the abuses in the system.  Double
billing for time, churning of hours reminiscent of what some stock
brokers have done with their customers’ disappearing portfolios,
billing for phantom hours (“I billed five hours for that memo be-
cause that’s what I charged my first client for it”), and other abuses
have been reported too often in the national press.
We would like to think these are aberrations but, in fact, we
suspect they more likely reflect an epidemic.  Before we condemn
the miscreants who have been “caught,” however, we must recog-
nize that the entire profession (or at least that portion that employs
billable hours as a basis for charging our clients) has created this
monster, that we all share some responsibility, and that we can take
steps to correct it.
What can we expect from our colleagues when law firms
proudly announce their billable hour quotas, goals or requirements
for paralegals, associates, and partners?  When we publish billable
hour results?  When penalties and awards are handed out based on
these numbers?  When partners and associates are asked to look
elsewhere when their billable hours don’t meet expectations? When
we use billable hours as a substitute for determining who is indolent
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and who is motivated despite the fact we all know totally conscien-
tious lawyers can have reduced billable hours simply because there
is not enough work?
If you were a client and were told you were being billed by the
hour, wouldn’t you feel slightly uneasy, or worse, if you knew that
the law firm you just hired had set a billable hour requirement for
its associates of 2000? Wouldn’t you worry that unfair pressure is
being put on these lawyers and that some of that quota would be
fulfilled at your expense?  Just as you might hesitate going to a phy-
sician for a judgment on whether to undertake an MRI when you
knew the physician owned the MRI center, the billable hour re-
quirements call into question the integrity of the hours the client is
billed.
Yet that integrity can be restored if the profession would  rise
up as one and condemn these unseemly billable hour goals, targets,
quotas, or whatever other euphemism is used to describe what eve-
rybody understands to be requirements, if law firms would an-
nounce they were jettisoning this problematic management
approach, if partners would  recognize  that it was not  the associ-
ates’ or the clients’ but their responsibility  to  keep  the  firm’s  law-
yers busy, and if law firm managers would embrace the notion that
the determination of  who was lazy and who dedicated to the busi-
ness of the law firm required far more subtle judgments and atten-
tion than  looking at some chart of lawyers ranked by hours billed
yesterday, last month, or last quarter.  We must throw off the ques-
tionable approach and restore to clients the confidence that when
hours are billed to their matters, it is because these hours were re-
quired and not because some lawyer was worried about keeping her
job.
C. Pro Bono Commitment
While eliminating the billable hour requirement would strike a
blow for ethics and professionalism, this argument should not be
taken as advocating for 1200 hour years.  To the contrary, the 1800
or 2000 hour year for those engaged full time seems perfectly ap-
propriate.  No dedicated lawyer should be spending significantly
less pursuing his or her career.  But instead of spinning wheels, law-
yers should be spending truly meaningful hours addressing the
problem that is presented by a disturbing disconnect that confronts
the profession.  On the one hand, firms are complaining that law-
yers’ hours are down, associates and partners are not fully engaged,
and that demand for high priced talent is not expanding fast enough
to feed the insatiable needs of firm expansion.  On the other, the
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current legal needs of the poor and the middle class have never
been more compelling.  Legal Services offices are closing, lawyers
for the indigent are being laid off, back-up Legal Services resource
centers specializing in health, housing, education, and other impor-
tant areas of concern have been shuttered, twenty-three post con-
viction defender organizations have been threatened or eliminated,
and among the middle class, it is almost impossible to find lawyers
to perform any services at affordable rates, other than those that
can be provided on a contingency.
One would think this coming together of demand and supply
would yield spectacular returns.  But, in fact, buyer and seller ha-
ven’t even met.  Law firms are busy celebrating what amounts to
little more than token results.  A whole ABA project has been built
around congratulating precious few lawyers contributing just three
percent of their time to the unmet needs of the poor.  And a few
firms’ extraordinary examples of pro bono service stand out in part
because almost no one else is doing it.  If hundreds of patients were
not receiving open heart surgery for lack of physicians, the screams
of outrage would be reproduced in twenty point type across the
headlines of America.  Yet literally hundreds are now on death row
without any counsel to process their first federal habeas corpus
petition.
To answer this need, why shouldn’t every firm of over fifty law-
yers take one of these admittedly gut-wrenching, time-consuming
cases?  With hundreds of talented and experienced legal services
lawyers being laid off, why shouldn’t every firm of over 100 hire
one, just one, legal services lawyer to be an in-house pro bono coor-
dinator?  With legal services offices closing throughout the major
cities, why shouldn’t every law firm with over 200 (over 150 firms)
lawyers establish a neighborhood office like Leonard, Street & Dei-
nard in Minneapolis to replace the needed services in the neighbor-
hoods?  And with fifteen key legal services back-up centers and
more post-conviction defender organizations closing, why shouldn’t
every firm of over 300 (over seventy in all) and every ABA Section
and major State Bar Association join together to “adopt” one of
these centers?
None of these suggestions is intended to “slight” solo practi-
tioners, lawyers in firms smaller than fifty or, most importantly,
lawyers practicing in-house.  The pro bono response must come
from the entire bar, though certainly those whose incomes soar into
higher six figures have less fiscal constraints on their being both
daring and dramatic.  One particularly disappointing area of pro
bono commitment at present is the thousands of talented lawyers
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employed by corporate America.  The few companies that have
made a major commitment have proved what can be done, even
when the lawyers are full-time corporate employees.  Yet they stand
in too sharp a contrast to an abdication by others that is totally
inconsistent with in-house counsels’ understandable demands to be
treated as full-fledged and fully respected members of the Bar.
And one perfect way to improve relations between outside counsel
and in-house lawyers is to establish partnerships in pro bono that
permit each side to bring their special talent and capacity to the
problems of the indigent.
The Biblical precept of tithing—contribution of ten percent—
could also be the goal for everyone in the legal profession.  And if
every lawyer in every law firm and law office cannot find an outlet
for 150 or 180 or 200 hours per year, let these lawyers, through
aggregation, achieve the same result by having some of their law-
yers devote full time or half time to legal services for the poor.
Lawyers have a monopoly on legal services.  What better way
is there to preserve this privilege than to demonstrate that without
mandatory pro bono or other involuntary programs, lawyers are
prepared to dedicate real time—ten percent of their time—to the
provision of free legal services to the needy?  Not only will this
commitment translate into a new view among the public of the legal
profession, but the effect on the lawyers, the satisfaction of dealing
with clients who truly appreciate what they are doing, the opportu-
nity to be self righteous, the chance to remember why one went to
law school, all will translate into a level of satisfaction that may, just
may, counterbalance the disquiet we hear so much about and assure
that every lawyer is busy for 1800 or 2000 hours, even  if they are
not all billable.
D. Quality of Life
While we are addressing hours, it is a good time to raise an-
other sensitive subject.  The profession has too easily fallen into a
trap that 1800 or 2000 billable (or non-billable) hours must be a
norm.  The latter represents forty hours per week with time off for
just a few major holidays.  Every conscientious lawyer knows two
things.  To be a good lawyer, significant additional time must be
devoted to reading advance sheets and law review articles, attend-
ing continuing legal education programs, and engaging in other ac-
tivities necessary to stay abreast of new developments.  Second,
unless one is attending a trial, a deposition or a closing, it is almost
impossible to get a billable hour out of an hour on the clock.  We
take breaks, are interrupted, eat lunch, grab a cup of coffee, take
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calls from friends and so on.  Which means an 1800 billable year
represents perhaps 2500 hours in the office or working at home, a
figure that translates into fifty hours per week.
This extraordinary expected time commitment, even when self-
imposed (and among most lawyers I know that is the case) exacts
two real costs.  First, we are working too hard, leaving ourselves not
enough time to enjoy families, read a novel, take in a concert, stare
at a gallery of paintings, walk in the woods, or pursue a hobby.  Sec-
ond, we are cheating the profession out of the opportunity to have
the participation of those who, out of necessity or choice, wish to
work part time, particularly given the fact that our profession’s
part-time commitment would translate into full time in most other
areas of endeavor.  We give lip service, of course, to accommodat-
ing the needs of those with child care responsibilities, but the statis-
tics on the dropout rate of those on whom these tasks fall most
heavily—women lawyers—suggest that we have failed miserably,
losing talent, dedication, diversity, and opportunity, while at the
same time creating an additional source of dissatisfaction that
overlays all of the other pressures on the profession.
So, while on the one hand I urge us to dedicate ourselves to
2000 hours per year, billable and non-billable, on the other, and
without being too inconsistent, I urge us to embrace to our profes-
sional bosom those who are forced or wish to work less.  And I ask
each of us to ask ourselves whether we wouldn’t be that much hap-
pier and better lawyers if a greater portion of our waking hours
were dedicated to some totally non-law related activities.
In the same vein, we should think of other ways to improve our
professional lives.  Go to a cocktail party with a group of lawyers,
listen to some tales of discontent, then ask who would leap at a
chance to take some real time off.  Suggest a sabbatical and a Greek
chorus will respond with enthusiasm that clearing the cobwebs is
just what is required.  But then you will learn, if the talk turns seri-
ous, that these lawyers couldn’t possibly do this because (1) they
fear losing clients, (2) their partners would never permit it, and (3)
they don’t know what they would do with the time.  Yet several
firms have elaborate and mandatory sabbatical programs in which
their lawyers successfully recharge their batteries teaching, writing,
traveling, or working in a legal aid office.  And if a few can do it,
any firm can if the bottom line ceases to be the only value, if part-
ners agree to backstop each other, and if the firms as institutions
recognize that the cost of this program will evaporate as their law-
yers become happier and come back refreshed with rich exper-
iences, enhancing their ability to be better lawyers.
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E. Client Loyalty
In addition, we must end the assault on client loyalty.  Many
forces have come together to create this problem.  First, there is the
breakdown of the client-lawyer relationship.  Gone are the days
when Caldwell & Moore was the exclusive law firm for First of Phil-
adelphia.  In part to enhance the power of in-house counsel, in part
to hire the best lawyers in particular specialties (“Caldwell &
Moore really isn’t very strong in environmental”), and in part to
conflict out a large number of capable firms, clients now spread the
work among ten, twenty or more firms.  Law firms in response have
felt that since The First is now using so many other law firms,
maybe there are certain matters Caldwell & Moore can take ad-
verse to The First.
Next, is the growth of large law firms, some numbering over a
thousand lawyers, operating in many cities, resulting in a concomi-
tant increase in the number of conflicts that they must confront to-
gether?  Third, is the lateral movement discussed earlier—lawyers
moving from firm to firm like free agent outfielders, carrying their
potential conflicts in their travel bags.  When these factors are ad-
ded to the last—the extraordinary financial pressure, in this cut
throat age when the generation of new client matters is the Holy
Grail, to avoid turning down a new matter—the assault on the pre-
sent conflict of interest rules becomes a crusade.
We now hear calls to permit wholesale screening of transfer-
ring lawyers, without client consent, forcing clients to accept on
faith and without protest that their lawyers carrying confidential in-
formation to the opposing law firm can be trusted not to share cli-
ent confidences.  We hear serious arguments that separate offices of
the same firm should be treated as different firms for conflict pur-
poses and stories are told of law firms in the mergers and acquisi-
tions area representing buyer and seller.  We have the State of
Texas adopt an “ethics” rule that permits representations adverse to
existing clients so long as the matters are not substantially related.
We watch an ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issue an opinion which permits lawyers to treat the
members of a corporate family as if they were separate clients.  We
observe Reporters for the ALI Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers seriously argue that a representation is not “adverse”
when you are on the other side of a transaction, as opposed to liti-
gation, with a present client.
All of these are frontal attacks on the traditional notions of
client loyalty.  The fact that they are responses to client conduct,
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financial pressure, and the realities of the legal employment mar-
ketplace is seen as justification enough for this trend.  However, as
a profession we cannot afford to accept such a wholesale challenge
to one of our fundamental values in the name of either retaliation
or financial expediency.  Not when the cost is the public’s view that
lawyers are willing to sacrifice traditional notions of loyalty, one of
the few principles that separates us from the commercial workplace.
The public simply will not regard the profession in the same way
when, without seeking client consent, we ask a client to accept the
lawyer who switched sides because he has been “screened”
(whatever that means).  Nor will we earn respect when we simply
inform the client that we have sued its subsidiary because the affili-
ate is not the client and, therefore, we owe it no duty.  Clients can-
not understand what ethical principle is being fostered by a rule
that concludes a law firm representing Chevrolet cannot sue Olds-
mobile, but a law firm representing Ford can sue Jaguar. Nor do
clients understand the narrow view that the only adverse represen-
tations subject to the conflicts rules are those in which there is some
animosity.
Regardless of the atmospherics, clients do not want their law-
yers on the other side without their consent; clients recognize that
adverse effects can result just as easily from a negotiation as from a
jury trial.  And every time we, as a profession, try to erect a sophis-
ticated argument around the conflict of interest rules, we may be
awarded for our ingenuity and even earn a few extra dollars, but
the cost to our professional image in the eyes of the public and,
more important, in our own eyes is again too high.
Now is a time, with the profession’s standing under attack,
when we must strengthen our ethical precepts, not undermine them
with proving how clever we are.  The principle of lawyer loyalty is
one of the most important factors that distinguishes us from the
commercial rabble; our goal has to be to err on the side of avoiding
conflicts, not seeing how close to the ethical boundary we can walk.
F. Relationships
We must learn to take care of each other.  So much of the
change in the profession reflects lawyers attacking lawyers, under-
mining our own institutions, abandoning our values for some fleet-
ing commercial advantage.  This is occurring at so many levels,
between outside counsel and in-house counsel, between partner
and associate, and even between partner and partner.
We must lower the decibel level in the relationship between
outside counsel and in-house counsel.  These lawyers are serving
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the same clients, and they have so much more to gain and to offer
from mutual respect and cooperation than they will ever gain from
some accomplishment that comes at the other’s expense.  We all
know that in-house counsel’s distrust, reflected in excessive record-
keeping requirements, a burgeoning bill-auditing business, second
guessing based on 20-20 hindsight, and threats to move the business
elsewhere, has prompted or been prompted by examples of exces-
sive billing, overstaffing, failures to communicate, and other trans-
gressions that outside counsel know all too well occur with too
much frequency.  Outside counsel has to recognize the enormous
pressures on in-house counsel, earn their trust by delivering high
quality services at a reasonable cost, and ensure in-house counsel is
kept well informed and is a full participant in the decision-making
process.  This should be reciprocated with the elimination of need-
less nit-picking, the prompt payment of invoices for professional
services without the need to fill in yet one more form, the building
of long term relationships, the sharing of responsibility for the re-
sults, and a reduction in the humiliating anxiety outside counsel
now endures.  All of this, of course, will have the added benefit of
assuring that the mutual client will get better services from a hap-
pier inside-outside team, simply because all members of the team
recognize the importance of taking care of each other.
We also must rebuild the values of our law firms, remembering
that while there is nothing wrong (and, indeed, everything right)
with putting firms on a business-like basis, law is not just a business,
that not every decision that improves the bottom line is, therefore,
the right one.  A big start would come if partners would make asso-
ciates feel that they are not simply so many billable hour producing
machines to be terminated as soon as they fail to meet firm billable
hour quotas or goals or when there is a one year downturn in their
area of practice.  We must assure associates that they are not partic-
ipating in a run for partnership where the route is obscure, the fin-
ish line ever receding, and the rules never stated.  We must make
sure our associates are not trapped in the library, stripped of their
weekends and nights at home, rarely receiving constructive criti-
cism and feedback, denied a sense of belonging that lawyers in an
earlier generation received in generous quantities.  It takes time, it
costs money, it’s hard work, but if we don’t provide the caring
mentoring, the understanding, and the leadership, partners will
reap as we sow.
Most important, because everything follows from it, law firms
must rededicate themselves to remembering what the title “part-
ner” means.  Nothing has provided more glue to our profession
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than the concept of partnership within law firms, the idea that at
some point judgments are made that a lawyer is worthy of being
invited into the firm, to be a partner, to earn something akin to
tenure, to know that more than equations will determine how part-
ners are prepared to take care of each other.  Prosperity appears to
be destroying this concept, turning partnership into a less secure
status than being an associate was just two decades ago.  But if we
cure our own houses where we live, then work on our relationships
with in-house counsel and clients, speak out on important issues
that confront the profession, remember that we are not operating
just another commercial enterprise, and dedicate ourselves to pro
bono, there is no limit to the success we can achieve.
***
